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Learning With Errors and Extrapolated
Dihedral Cosets
Zvika Brakerski⋆, Elena Kirshanova⋆⋆, Damien Stehle´⋆ ⋆ ⋆, and Weiqiang Wen†
Abstract. The hardness of the learning with errors (LWE) problem is
one of the most fruitful resources of modern cryptography. In particu-
lar, it is one of the most prominent candidates for secure post-quantum
cryptography. Understanding its quantum complexity is therefore an im-
portant goal.
We show that under quantum polynomial time reductions, LWE is equiv-
alent to a relaxed version of the dihedral coset problem (DCP), which
we call extrapolated DCP (eDCP). The extent of extrapolation varies
with the LWE noise rate. By considering different extents of extrapo-
lation, our result generalizes Regev’s famous proof that if DCP is in
BQP (quantum poly-time) then so is LWE (FOCS 02). We also discuss
a connection between eDCP and Childs and Van Dam’s algorithm for
generalized hidden shift problems (SODA 07).
Our result implies that a BQP solution for LWE might not require the
full power of solving DCP, but rather only a solution for its relaxed
version, eDCP, which could be easier.
1 Introduction
The Learning With Errors problem LWEn,q,α with parameters n, q ∈ Z and
α ∈ (0, 1) consists in finding a vector s ∈ Znq from arbitrarily many samples
(ai, 〈ai, s〉 + ei) ∈ Znq × Zq, where ai is uniformly sampled in Znq and ei is
sampled from DZ,αq, the discrete Gaussian distribution of standard deviation
parameter αq (i.e., the distribution such that DZ,αq(k) ∼ exp(−πk2/(αq)2) for
all k ∈ Z). Since its introduction by Regev [27,28], LWE has served as a se-
curity foundation for numerous cryptographic primitives (see e.g. an overview
in [23]). The cryptographic attractiveness of LWE stems from two particularly
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desirable properties. First, its algebraic simplicity enables the design of primi-
tives with advanced functionalities, such as fully homomorphic encryption [7],
attribute-based encryption for all circuits [13] and (single key) functional en-
cryption [12]. Second, LWE is conjectured hard even in the context of quantum
computations, making it one of the most appealing candidate security founda-
tions for post-quantum cryptography [5]. Current quantum algorithms for LWE
do not outperform classical ones, but it is not clear whether this is inherent
(for example, it is known that LWE is easier than the Dihedral Coset Problem
under polynomial-time reductions, see below). In this work, we characterize the
quantum hardness of LWE under polynomial-time reductions and show that it is
computationally equivalent (up to small parameter losses) to a quantum problem
closely related to the aforementioned Dihedral Coset Problem.
LWE, Lattices and the Dihedral Coset Problem. LWE is tightly connected to
worst-case approximation problems over Euclidean lattices. In particular, LWE
is an (average-case) instance of the Bounded Distance Decoding problem (BDD)
(see, e.g., [20, Section 5.4]), but is also known to be as hard as worst-case BDD
(with some polynomial loss in parameters) [28]. BDD is the problem of finding
the closest lattice vector to a given target point which is promised to be very close
to the lattice (formally, closer than λ1/γ where λ1 is the length of the shortest
non-zero vector). Classical and quantum connections between BDD and other
problems such as SIVP, GapSVP, uSVP are also known [6,19,22,28].
Regev [24,26] showed that uSVP, and therefore also BDD and LWE, are no
harder to solve than the quantumly-defined Dihedral Coset Problem (DCP). An
instance of DCPN,ℓ, for integer parameters N and ℓ, consists of ℓ quantum reg-
isters in superposition |0, xk〉+ |1, xk + s〉, with a common s ∈ ZN and random
and independent xk ∈ ZN for k ∈ [ℓ]. The goal is to find s (information theoret-
ically ℓ = O(logN) is sufficient for this task [9]). We note that Regev considered
a variant with unbounded number of registers, but where a fraction of them is
faulty (a faulty state is of the form |b, xk〉 for arbitrary b ∈ {0, 1}, xk ∈ ZN ). In
our work, we assume a non-faulty formulation of DCP.
Still, it is quite possible that DCP is in fact much harder to solve than
LWE. The best known algorithm for DCP, due to Kuperberg [16], runs in time
2O(log ℓ+logN/ log ℓ) which does not improve upon classical methods for solving
LWE. Other variants of the problem were explored in [9,10], and of particular
relevance to this work is a “vector” variant of the problem where ZN is replaced
with Znq (i.e. s and xk are now vectors). These problems behave similarly to
DCP with N = qn.
Finally, Regev showed that DCP can be solved given efficient algorithms for
the subset-sum problem (which is classically defined), however in a regime of
parameters that appears harder to solve than LWE itself.
Extrapolated DCP. The focus of this work is a generalization of the DCP prob-
lem, i.e. rather than considering registers containing |0, xk〉+|1, xk + s〉, we allow
(1) xi’s and s be n-dimensional vectors, and (2) other than non-uniform distribu-
tion for amplitudes. We name this problem Extrapolated DCP (EDCP) as its in-
2
put registers has more extrapolated states. To be more precise, EDCPℓn,N,f , with
parameters three integers n,N, ℓ and a function f : Z 7→ C with∑j∈Z j·|f(j)|2 <
+∞, consists in recovering s ∈ ZnN from the following ℓ states over Z× ZnN :
 1√∑
j∈Z |f(j)|2
·
∑
j∈Z
f(j) |j,xk + j · s〉


k≤ℓ
,
where the xk’s are arbitrary in Z
n
N .
1 Note that DCP is the special case of EDCP
for n = 1 and f being the indicator function of {0, 1}.
In [8], Childs and van Dam consider a special case of EDCP where f is the
indicator function of {0, . . . ,M − 1} for some integer M , which we will refer to
as uniform EDCP (or, U-EDCPℓn,N,M).
Our Main Result. We show that up to polynomial loss in parameters, U-EDCP is
equivalent to LWE. Thus we provide a formulation of the hardness assumption
underlying lattice-based cryptography in terms of the (generalized) Dihedral
Coset Problem.
Theorem 1 (Informal). There exists a quantum polynomial-time reduction
from LWEn,q,α to U-EDCP
ℓ
n,N,M , with N = q, ℓ = poly(n log q) and M =
poly(n log q)
α . Conversely, there exists a polynomial-time reduction from U-EDCP
to LWE with the same parameter relationships, up to poly(n log q) factors.
Our proof crucially relies on a special case of EDCP where f is a Gaussian
weight function with standard deviation parameter r. We call this problem Gaus-
sian EDCP (G-EDCP). We show that G-EDCP and U-EDCP are equivalent up
to small parameter losses.
EDCP is analogous to LWE in many aspects. The decisional version of LWE
(dLWE) asks to distinguish between LWE samples and random samples of the
form (a, b) ∈ Znq × Zq where both components are chosen uniformly at random.
Similarly, we also consider the decisional version of EDCP, denoted by dEDCP.
In dEDCPn,N,f , we are asked to distinguish between an EDCP state and a state
of the form
|j〉 |x mod N〉 ,
where j is distributed according to the function |f |2, and x ∈ ZnN is uniformly
chosen. EDCP enjoys a reduction between its search and decisional variants via
LWE.
Related work. In [8], Childs and van Dam show that U-EDCPℓ1,N,M reduces
to the problem of finding all the solutions b ∈ {0, . . . ,M − 1}k to the equa-
tion 〈b,x〉 = w mod N , where x and w are given and uniformly random mod-
ulo N . They interpret this as an integer linear program and use lattice reduc-
tion, within Lenstra’s algorithm [18], to solve it. This leads to a polynomial-time
1 Note that the assumption on f implies, via Markov’s inequality, that one may re-
strict the sum to a finite index set and obtain a superposition which remains within
negligible ℓ2 distance from the countable superposition above.
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algorithm for U-EDCPℓ1,N,M when M = ⌊N1/k⌋ and ℓ ≥ k, for any k ≥ 3. Inter-
estingly, finding small solutions to the equation 〈b,x〉 = w mod N is a special
case of the Inhomogeneous Small Integer Solution problem [11] (ISIS), which
consists in finding a small-norm x such that Bx = w mod q, with B ∈ Zn×mq
and w ∈ Znq uniform (where q, n,m are integer parameters). A reduction from
the homogeneous SIS (i.e., with w = 0 and x 6= 0) to LWE was provided in [30].
It does not seem possible to derive from it a reduction from EDCP to LWE
via the Childs and van Dam variant of ISIS, most notably because the reduc-
tion from [30] does not provide a way to compute all ISIS solutions within a
box {0, 1, . . . ,M − 1}k.
It is not hard to see that, at least so long as M is polynomial, a solution
to DCP implies a solution to EDCPℓn,N,M . Therefore our result implies [24] as
a special case. On the other extreme, our result also subsumes [8] since the
LLL algorithm [17] can be used to solve LWEn,q,α in polynomial time when 1/α
and q are 2Θ(n), which implies a polynomial-time algorithm for EDCP for M =
2Θ(
√
n logN), significantly improving Childs and van Dam’s M = 2εn logN .
Finally, we observe that the LWE to U-EDCP reduction (and the uSVP to
DCP reduction from [26]) can be adapted to a uSVP to U-EDCP reduction, as
explained below. Combining this adaptation with the reduction from U-EDCP to
LWE (via G-EDCP) provides a novel quantum reduction from worst-case lattice
problems to LWE. However, it does not seem to have advantages compared
to [28].
1.1 Technical overview
As mentioned above, the hardness of LWE is essentially invariant so long as
n log q is preserved, and therefore we restrict our attention in this overview to
the one-dimensional setting. A crucial ingredient in our reduction is a weighted
version of EDCP, denoted by G-EDCP and quantified by a Gaussian weight
function fr(j) =ρr(j) = exp(−πj2/r2), for some standard deviation parameter r.
We refer to this problem as Gaussian EDCP (G-EDCP).
Reducing G-EDCP to LWE. Given an G-EDCP state as input, our reduction
efficiently transforms it into a classical LWE sample with constant success prob-
ability. Thus, making only one query to the LWE oracle, we are able to solve
G-EDCP. More precisely, the reduction input consists of a normalized state
corresponding to
∑
j∈ZN ρr(j) |j〉 |x+ j · s mod N〉, for some integers r ≪ N .
One can think of N as the LWE modulus and of r as the standard deviation
parameter of the LWE error.
Our first step is to apply a quantum Fourier transform over ZN to the second
register. This gives us a quantum superposition of the form:
∑
a∈ZN
∑
j∈ZN
ω
a·(x+j·s)
N · ρr(j) |j〉 |a〉 .
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Fig. 1: Graph of reductions between the LWE problem (upper-left), worst-case
lattice problems (upper-right), combinatorial problems (lower-right) and the Ex-
trapolated Dihedral Coset problems (lower-left). Parameters α are given up to
poly(n)-factors, where n is the dimension of the LWE problem. The same n
stands for the lattice-dimension considered in problems of the upper-right cor-
ner. The subset-sum problem stated in the lower-right corner is of density ≈ 1
(in particular, the expected number of solutions is constant).
5
where ωN = exp(2iπ/N). We then measure the second register and obtain a
value â ∈ ZN . This leaves us with the state:∑
j∈ZN
ωj·â·sN · ρr(j) |j〉 |â〉 .
Note that â is uniformly random over ZN , which at the end serves as the first
component of LWE sample. The exponent of relative phase in current state has a
form similar to the second component of LWE sample but without noise. Now we
can benefit from the first register, which stores a superposition corresponding to
a Gaussian distribution over ZN with standard deviation r. Applying a second
quantum Fourier transform over ZN to the first register gives us a quantum
superposition of the form:∑
b∈ZN
∑
j∈ZN
ω
j·(â·s+b)
N · ρr(j) |b〉 .
Now the second component of the LWE sample â ·s+ b is stored in the phase
(up to a factor j). Omitting the exponentially small Gaussian tail, we assume
the summation for j is taken over the integers. An application of the Poisson
summation formula transfers â · s + b into a shift of the Gaussian distribution
defined over Z. In other words, the received state is exponentially close to the
superposition: ∑
e∈ZN
ρ1/r
( e
N
)
|−â · s+ e〉 .
Once we measure the state above, we obtain a value −â·s+e, where e ←֓ DZ,N/r.
Together with already known â, this gives us an LWE sample:
(−â,−â · s+ e) .
In case the input state is of the form |j〉 |x mod N〉, where j is distributed
according to the function ρ2r, and x ∈ ZN is uniformly chosen (the decisional
case), the reduction outlined above outputs a uniform random pair (a, b) from
ZN×ZN . This gives a reduction from decisional version of G-EDCP to decisional
version of LWE.
Reducing LWE to G-EDCP. Our reduction from LWE to G-EDCP follows the
general design of Regev’s reduction from uSVP to DCP [26], with several twists
that enable simplifications and improvements. We note that this reduction is
folklore,2 although we could not find it described explicitly.
First, the use of LWE rather than uSVP allows us to avoid Regev’s initial sub-
reduction from uSVP to BDD, as LWE is a randomized variant of BDD. Indeed,
if we consider m samples (ai, ai · s + ei) from LWEn,q,α, then we have a BDD
instance for the lattice Λ = AZq + qZ
m and the target vector t = b + e ∈ Zm
with b ∈ Λ satisfying b = A · s mod q.
2 https://groups.google.com/d/msg/cryptanalytic-algorithms/uhr6gGrVkIk/XxEv4uvEBwAJ
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As Regev’s, our reduction proceeds by subdividing the ambient space Rm
with a coarse grid, setting the cell width between ‖e‖ and λ1(Λ). We map each
point y ∈ Rm to a cell φ(y). By choice of the cell width, we have φ(c1) 6= φ(c2)
for any c1 6= c2 in Λ. Also for any c ∈ Rm, the vectors c and c+e are most likely
mapped to the same cell, as e is short. This intuition fails if a border between
two cells falls close to c. This (rare but non-negligibly so) event is the source of
the limitation on the number ℓ of DCP/EDCP states produced by the reduction.
The space subdivision by a grid is illustrated in Figure 2.
d
d
r
Fig. 2: A visualization of the space subdivision. Each radially shaded disk has
width r, the upper bound of the error ‖e‖. Each cell has width d, chosen to be
between ‖e‖ and λ1(L)/√m. Note that the grid intersects the left-most disk,
potentially leading to an error in the reduction.
Regev’s reduction and ours differ in the way the grid is used to create the
DCP/EDCP states. Let us first briefly recall the core of Regev’s reduction.
Let B = (b1, . . . ,bm) be a basis of Λ and subtract an appropriate combination
of the bi’s from t to get t
′ so that the coordinates x′ of the closest vector b′ ∈ Λ
to t′with respect to the bi’s are ≤ 2m (this may be achieved using LLL [17]
and Babai’s nearest plane algorithm [1]). The first step is the creation of a
superposition ∑
x∈Zm
‖x‖∞≤22m
(|0,x, φ(Bx)〉+ |1,x, φ(Bx− t′)〉) =
|0〉
∑
x∈Zm
‖x‖∞≤22m
|x, φ(Bx)〉+ |1〉
∑
x∈Zm
‖x+x′‖∞≤22m
|x+ x′, φ(Bx− e)〉 ,
where the equality holds by a change of variable. By measuring the last register,
with overwhelming probability this collapses to |0〉 |xk〉 + |1〉 |xk + x′〉, which
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corresponds to an m-dimensional DCP input state with modulus 2O(m). The
whole process can be repeated multiple times using the same input vector t, and
results in different xk’s but a common x
′. Each iteration may fail because of an ill-
placed cell delimitation, or if xk+x
′ has a coordinate whose magnitude is larger
than 22m. This leads to a bounded number of correct DCP input states. Finally,
m-dimensional DCP can be reduced to 1-dimensional DCP, with a significant
modulus increase: the resulting modulus N is 2O(m
2).
Instead of using a superposition based on the coordinates with respect to
a basis, we exploit the special form of Λ = aZq + qZ
m (w.l.o.g., assume 1-
dimensional LWE, [6]). We start with the following superposition:∑
x∈Zq
|0, x, φ(ax)〉+ |1, x, φ(ax − t)〉= |0〉
∑
x∈Zq
|x, φ(ax)〉+ |1〉
∑
x∈Zq
|x+ s, φ(ax − e)〉 .
We then measure the last register (classically known and omitted) and hopefully
obtain a superposition |0〉 |x〉 + |1〉 |x+ s〉. This approach has several notable
advantages. First, by using a grid over the torus Rm/qRm, the only source of
failure is the position of the cell delimitation (coordinates cannot spill over, they
wrap around). Second, we directly end up with a DCP state, not a vectorial
variant thereof. Third, and most importantly, the DCP modulus N is only q
and not 2O(m
2). Note that m should be set as Ω(log q) for s to be uniquely
determined by the LWE samples. This improvement results in a much tighter
reduction.
The improvement stems from the use of a small modulus q rather than large
integer coordinates. It is possible to obtain such a small DCP modulus while
starting from BDD (rather than LWE), by modifying Regev’s reduction as fol-
lows. One may first reduce BDD to a variant thereof that asks to find the co-
ordinates of the BDD solution modulo a small modulus q rather than over the
integers. Such a reduction is presented in [28, Lemma 3.5]. One may then reduce
this BDD variant to DCP as we proceed for LWE. Note that this transforma-
tion makes the BDD to DCP reduction from [26] iterative: the DCP oracle is
called several times, and the input of an oracle call depends on the output of
the previous oracle calls. This is akin to the phenomenon described in the open
questions paragraph from [6].
A further difference between our reduction and the one from [26] is that we
consider larger multiples of s in the input superposition to obtain a state of the
form
∑
j ρr(j) |j〉 |x+ js〉, with r ≈ 1/α (up to polynomial factors). This does
not lead to any extra complication, but leads us to G-EDCP rather than DCP,
which we crucially need to allow for a converse reduction. We conjecture that
G-EDCP is strictly easier than DCP.
As Regev [25], we can also improve the resulting deviation parameter r of
G-EDCP by a factor of
√
m using balls’ intersections rather than cube separa-
tion. We consider intersections of balls drawn around a · s and its noisy shifts.
The radius R of each ball is set to be the largest value such that the balls aris-
ing from different s (and their shifts) do not intersect. We are interested in the
intersection area the balls drawn around ±s,±2s, etc. Following Regev [25], this
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area is large enough to guarantee that once we measure, we hit a point from the
intersection of all the balls (see grey areas in Figure 3).
λ1(Λq(a))
d
R
Fig. 3: A visualization of the balls’ intersections. The lattice points (black dots)
are of distance first minimum of lattice aZq + qZ to each other. The distance
between the two furtherst shifts ‖je‖ (red dots) has an upper bound, denoted
by d. Each ball has a radius R chosen to be (approximately) λ1(Λq(a))/2, where
Λq(a) = aZq + qZ. Note that once the shaded gray area is measured, the re-
duction succeeds in outputting an G-EDCP sample. For the reduction to work
with a constant success probability, the shaded area has to have a large enough
proportion compared to the volume of the balls.
The same algorithm provides a reduction from dLWE to dG-EDCP. Given a
random sample (a,b) ∈ Zmq × Zmq , it suffices to show that all the balls centered
at as+ jb for s ∈ Zq and j ∈ Z, do not intersect with each other. All the points
considered above form the lattice (a|b)Zq + qZ, We argue analogously using
the upper-bound on the minima of this lattice. As a result, the superposition
collapses exactly to one of the balls, which gives a random sample of dG-EDCP.
1.2 Open problems
Towards an alternative reduction from EDCP to LWE. In [8], Childs and van
Dam obtain a state of the form∑
a∈ZN
∑
j∈{0,...,M−1}ℓ
〈j,y〉=a mod N
ωa·sN |j〉 .
for some uniform y ∈ ZℓN . Note the uniform distribution of weights for j. To
recover s, the authors use the Pretty Good Measurement technique from [15]
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as was done in [2,3] for similar problems. Implementing this general technique
to this particular setup requires the construction of a POVM with operators
corresponding to superpositions of all the j’s in {0, . . . ,M−1}ℓ such that 〈j,y〉 =
a mod N . As we already mentioned, a unitary operator that realizes such a
POVM, uses a lattice-reduction technique as its main subroutine and, hence,
works efficiently only for large values of M .
The question we do not address here is the interpretation of the POVM
technique (and, possibly, a different reduction to LWE) for Gaussian-weighted
superpositions. It might be simpler to obtain Gaussian j’s rather than uniform
from a cube, and hence it is possible that such a technique may lead to an
improved reduction to LWE.
Hardness of EDCP with more input states. We show in this work that LWE and
U-EDCP are computationally equivalent up to small parameter losses, when the
number of U-EDCP states ℓ is polynomial. In these reductions, the U-EDCP
bound M is within a polynomial factor of the LWE noise rate 1/α. When
more states are available, U-EDCP is likely to become easier. For instance,
with M = 2, the best known algorithms when ℓ is polynomially bounded are
exponential. Oppositely, Kuperberg’s algorithm [16] runs in time 2O˜(
√
logN)
when ℓ = 2O˜(
√
logN). This suggests that there may be a U-EDCP self-reduction
allowing to trade ℓ for M : Is it possible to reduce EDCPN,ℓ,M to EDCPN,ℓ′,M ′
with ℓ′ ≤ ℓ, while allowing for M ′ ≥M?
2 Prerequisites
Notations. We use lower case bold letters to denote vectors and upper case
bold to denote matrices. For a vector x, we let ‖x‖∞ denote its ℓ∞ norm and
‖x‖ denote its ℓ2 norm. We let ZN denote the cyclic group {0, 1, · · · , N − 1}
with addition modulo N . We assume we can compute with real numbers. All the
arguments are valid if a sufficiently accurate approximation is used instead. For
a distribution D, the notation x ←֓ D means that x is sampled from D. For a
set S, we let x ←֓ S denote that x is a uniformly random element from S.
For any r > 0, we let ρr(x) denote exp(−π‖x‖2/r2), where x ∈ Rn for a
positive integer n. We let DZ,r denote a Gaussian distribution over the integers
with density function proportional to ρr(·). We let DΛ,r,c denote the Gaussian
distribution over the n-dimensional lattice Λ (for a positive integer n), with
standard deviation parameter r ∈ R and center c ∈ Rn. If c = 0, we omit it.
We let Bn(c, R) denote the n-dimensional Euclidean ball of radius R centered
at c ∈ Rn and Bn denotes the n-dimensional Euclidean unit ball centered at 0.
We use ωN as a short-hand for exp(2πi/N).
For a lattice Λ with a basis B, the parallelepiped P(B) = {Bx : 0 ≤ xi ≤ 1}
is a fundamental domain of Λ. We let λ1(Λ) (resp. λ
∞
1 (Λ)) denote the ℓ2-norm
(ℓ∞-norm) of a shortest vector of Λ. We let Λ⋆ = {y ∈ Rn : ∀x ∈ Λ, 〈x,y〉 ∈ Z}
denote the dual of a lattice Λ. We define the smoothing parameter ηε(Λ) as be
10
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√
κr EDCP
ℓ
n,q,r EDCP
ℓ/κ
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DCP
ℓ/(κ2r)
q
DCP
ℓ/(κ2 log r)
q
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√
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Theorems 2, 3
Theorem 4
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Fig. 4: Graph of reductions between the extrapolated Dihedral Coset Problem
instantiated with uniform distribution over {0, 1, . . . , r − 1} (the first and the
third problems from the left) and ℓ-sample Gaussian EDCP with parameter r
(the middle problem). We assume all the parameters n (the dimension), q (the
modulus) and r are functions of a common parameter κ. The most relevant choice
of such a relation one can keep in mind is when n, ℓ, q and r are poly(κ). One can
trace the losses in the parameters (with respect to the number of samples ℓ and
to r) once we move from one problem to another. Notice that some reductions
may be performed in two ways. For example, using the self-reducibility property
of EDCP (Lemma 10), we can bypass Gaussian EDCP and have a more sample-
efficient reduction from EDCP with large r to an EDCP with smaller r. Similarly,
Gaussian EDCP can be reduced to DCP either directly (Lemma 11) or via
uniform EDCP.
The two central reductions that show equivalence between LWE and EDCP
problems are on the vertical line. As for EDCP, the LWE parameters n, q, and
α are functions of κ. We present two reductions from LWE to EDCP, the stronger
one gives a tighter result for the error-parameter by a factor of
√
m.
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the smallest r such that ρ1/r(Λ
⋆\{0}) ≤ ε for an n-dimensional lattice Λ and
positive ε > 0.
For A ∈ Zm×nq , we define two lattices Λq(A) = {Ax mod q : x ∈ Znq } and
Λ⊥q (A) = {y ∈ Znq s.t. Ay = 0 mod q}.
We introduce a variable κ to relate all the parameters involved in the defini-
tions below. Namely, n, q, etc. are actually functions in κ: n(κ), q(κ). We omit
the variable κ for clarity.
Definition 1 (Search LWE). Given a parameter κ, the input to the search
LWEmn,q,χ with dimension n ≥ 1, modulus q ≥ 2 and distribution χ over Z,
consists of m ≥ n many samples of the form (a, b) ∈ Znq ×Zq, with a ←֓ Znq , b =
〈a, s〉+e and e ←֓ χ, where s ∈ Znq is uniformly chosen. We say that an algorithm
solves the search LWEmn,q,χ if it outputs s with probability poly(1/(n log q)) in
time poly(n log q).
Definition 2 (Decision LWE). Given a parameter κ, the decisional LWEmn,q,χ
with dimension n ≥ 1, modulus q ≥ 2 and distribution χ over Z, asks to dis-
tinguish between m ≥ n many LWE samples and random samples of the form
(a, b) ∈ Znq ×Zq, with a ←֓ Znq , b ←֓ Zq. We say that an algorithm solves the deci-
sional LWEmn,q,χ if it succeeds in distinguishing with probability poly(1/(n log q))
in time poly(n log q).
We let LWEmn,q,α (resp. dLWE
m
n,q,α) denote search (resp. decisional) LWE
problem with m samples of dimension n, modulus q, error distributed as DZ,αq.
Definition 3 (Dihedral Coset Problem). Given a parameter κ, the input
to the DCPℓN with modulus N consists of ℓ states. Each state is of the form
(normalization is omitted)
|0〉 |x〉 + |1〉 |(x+ s) mod N〉 , (1)
stored on 1 + ⌈log2N⌉ qubits, where x ∈ ZN is arbitrary and s ∈ ZN is fixed
throughout all the states. We say that an algorithm solves DCPℓN if it outputs s
with probability poly(1/ logN) in time poly(logN).
Note that Regev in [24] defines the Dihedral Coset problem slightly dif-
ferently. Namely, he introduces a failure parameter f(κ), and with probability
≤ 1/(logN(κ)f(κ)), we have a state of the form |b〉 |x〉 for arbitrary b ∈ {0, 1}n
and x ∈ ZN . Such a state does not contain any information on s. Our definition
takes 0 for the failure parameter. Conversely, Regev’s definition is our Def. 3
with a reduced number of input states.
Now we define the problem which can be viewed as an extension of DCP.
Analogous to LWE, it has two versions: search and decisional.
Definition 4 (Search Extrapolated Dihedral Coset Problem). Given
a parameter κ, the input to the search Extrapolated Dihedral Coset Problem
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(EDCPℓn,N,D) with dimension n, modulus N and a discrete distribution D, con-
sists of ℓ input states of the form (normalization is omitted)∑
j∈supp(D)
D(j) |j〉 |(x+ j · s) mod N〉 , (2)
where x ∈ ZnN is arbitrary and s ∈ ZnN is fixed for all ℓ states. We say that an al-
gorithm solves search EDCPℓn,N,D if it outputs s with probability poly(1/(n logN))
in time poly(n logN).
Definition 5 (Decisional Extrapolated Dihedral Coset Problem). Given
a parameter κ, the decisional Extrapolated Dihedral Coset Problem (dEDCPℓn,N,D)
with modulus N and a discrete distribution D, asks to distinguish between ℓ many
EDCP samples and ℓ many random samples of the form
|jk〉 |xk mod N〉 , (3)
where jk ←֓ D2 and xk ∈ ZnN is uniformly chosen for 1 ≤ k ≤ ℓ. We say that an
algorithm solves dEDCPℓn,N,D if it distinguishes the two cases with probability
poly(1/(n logN)) in time poly(n logN).
Different choices of D give rise to different instantiations of EDCP. The two
interesting ones are: (1) D is uniform over ZM for someM ∈ Z, which we further
denote as U-EDCPℓn,N,M and (2) D is Gaussian DZ,r, which we further denote
as G-EDCPℓn,N,r. The former, named the generalized hidden shift problem, was
already considered in [8]. The latter is central in our reductions. Correspondingly,
we call the decisional version of G-EDCP by dG-EDCP.
Gaussian distribution on lattices. In the following, we recall some important
properties of discrete Gaussian distribution.
Lemma 1. For any κ, r > 0, we have ρr(Z\[−√κr,√κr]) < 2−Ω(κ)ρr(Z).
For the sake of completeness, we include the proof in Appendix A.1.
From Lemma 1, we can see that the tail of Gaussian distribution has only
negligible proportion compared to the whole sum. We use this fact within a
quantum superposition state. For a quantum superposition state with Gaussian
amplitudes, the superposition corresponding to Gaussian distribution over full
lattice and the one without Gaussian tail have exponentially small ℓ2 distance.
Lemma 2 ([4, Lemma 1.5(ii)]). For any n-dimensional lattice Λ and u ∈ Rn,
it holds that
ρr(Λ + u\B(0,
√
nr)) < 2−Ω(n)ρr(Λ).
Lemma 3 (Poisson Summation Formula). For any n-dimensional lattice Λ
and vector u ∈ Rn, it holds that
ρr(Λ + u) = det(Λ
⋆) · rn ·
∑
x∈Λ⋆
e2πi〈x,u〉ρ1/r(x).
13
The following Lemma is originally due to Grover-Rudolph [14] and was
adapted to Gaussian distribution in [28].
Lemma 4 (Adapted from [27, Lemma 3.12]). Given a parameter κ and an
integer r, there exists an efficient quantum algorithm that outputs a state that is
within ℓ2 distance 2
−Ω(κ) of the normalized state corresponding to∑
x∈Z
ρr(x) |x〉 .
The following two lemmata are well-known facts about lower-bounds on min-
imum of q-ary lattices.
Lemma 5. Given a uniformly chosen matrix A ∈ Zm×nq for some positive inte-
gers q, m and n such that m ≥ n, then we have λ∞1 (Λq(A)) ≥ q(m−n)/m/2 and
λ∞1 (Λ
⊥
q (A)) ≥ qn/m/2 both with probability 1− 2−m.
Lemma 6. Given a uniformly chosen matrix A ∈ Zm×nq for some positive inte-
ger q, m and n such that m ≥ n, then we have λ1(Λq(A)) ≥ min{q,
√
mq(m−n)/m
2
√
2πe
}
with probability 1− 2−m.
Reductions between EDCP variants. In the following, we show that the EDCP
problem is analogue to the LWE problem in many aspects: (1) Gaussian-EDCP
(G-EDCPℓ
′
n,N,r) and uniform-EDCP (U-EDCP
ℓ
n,N,M ) are equivalent, up to small
parameter losses; (2) EDCP enjoys the self-reduction property as we show in
Lemma 10. The main ingredient in both proofs is quantum rejection sampling
due to Ozols et al. [21].
Lemma 7 ([21, Sec. 4]). There is a quantum rejection sampling algorithm,
which given as input
n∑
k=1
πk |k〉 |ηk〉 ,
for some probability πk, outputs
1
‖p‖
n∑
k=1
pk |k〉 |ηk〉 .
for some pk ≤ πk, with probability ‖p‖2 =
∑n
k=1 p
2
k.
Lemma 8 (G-EDCP ≤ U-EDCP). Let N,n and ℓ be integers greater than 1,
r be any real number, and let M = c · r for some constant c such that M is an
integer. Then there is a probabilistic reduction with run-time polynomial in κ,
from G-EDCPℓn,N,r to U-EDCP
O(ℓ/κ)
n,N,M .
Proof. We are given as input G-EDCPℓn,N,r states:

∑
j∈Z
ρr(j) |j〉 |(xk + j · s) mod N〉


k≤ℓ
.
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Our aim is to find s, given access to a U-EDCP
O(ℓ/κ)
n,N,cr oracle for some constant c.
For each G-EDCPn,N,r sample, we proceed as follows. We let sign(x) to
denote the sign of x, its output is either 1 (for ‘ + ’) or 0 (for ‘ − ’). We first
compute the sign of the first register and store it in a new register:∑
j∈Z
ρr(j) |j〉 |(x+ j · s) mod N〉 |sign(j)〉 .
Second, we measure the third register. Note that we observe 1 with probabil-
ity at least 1/2, independently over all k’s. If the observed value is 0, we discard
the state. From states with the observed value 1, we obtain (up to normalization):∑
j∈Z+
ρr(j) |j〉 |(x+ j · s) mod N〉 .
Using quantum rejection sampling (Lemma 7), we transform a G-EDCPN,ℓ,r
state into a U-EDCPn,N,M state of the form∑
j∈[0,M−1]
|j〉 |(x+ j · s) mod N〉
with probability Ω(Mρ2r(c · r)/r) = Ω(1).
We repeat the above procedure until we obtain O(ℓ/κ) many U-EDCPn,N,M
states, which happens with probability ≥ 1−2−Ω(κ). We call the U-EDCPO(ℓ/κ)n,N,M
oracle to recover the secret s as the solution for the input G-EDCPℓn,N,r instance.
Lemma 9 (U-EDCP ≤ G-EDCP). Let N , M , n and ℓ be integers greater than
1, r be any real number, such that M =
√
κ·r = poly(κ) is an integer. Then there
is a probabilistic reduction with run-time polynomial in κ, from U-EDCPℓn,N,M
to G-EDCP
O(ℓ/κ1.5)
n,N,r .
Proof. We are given as input ℓ many U-EDCPℓn,N,M states:

∑
j∈[0,M−1]
|j〉 |(x+ j · s) mod N〉


k≤ℓ
.
Our aim is to find s, given access to a G-EDCP
O(ℓ/κ1.5)
n,N,r oracle where r =M/
√
κ.
For each U-EDCPn,N,M state we proceed as follows. First, we symmetrize
the uniform distribution by applying the function f(x) = x − ⌊(M − 1)/2⌋ to
the first register:∑
j∈[0,M−1]
|j − ⌊(M − 1)/2⌋〉|(x+ j · s) mod N〉 =
∑
j′∈
[
−⌊M−12 ⌋,⌈M−12 ⌉
]|j′〉 |(x′ + j′ · s) mod N〉 ,
where j′ = j − ⌊(M − 1)/2⌋, x′ = x+ ⌈(M − 1)/2⌉ · s.
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Using rejection sampling (Lemma 7), with probability Ω(r/M) = Ω(1/
√
κ)
we transform each U-EDCPn,N,⌈M−12 ⌉ state into a G-EDCPn,N,r state:∑
j′∈
[
−⌊M−12 ⌋,⌈M−12 ⌉
]ρr(j′) |j′〉 |(x′ + j′ · s) mod N〉 .
According to Lemma 1, the latter is within the ℓ2 distance of 2
−Ω(κ) away
from the state ∑
j′∈Z
ρr(j
′) |j′〉 |(x′ + j′ · s) mod N〉 .
We repeat the above procedure until we obtainO(ℓ/κ1.5) many G-EDCPn,N,r
states, which happens with probability ≥ 1 − 2−Ω(κ). Then we can use the
G-EDCP
O(ℓ/κ1.5)
n,N,r oracle to recover the secret s as the solution to U-EDCP
ℓ
n,N,M .
Next, we show the self-reducibility property for EDCP. We refer the reader
to Appendix A.2 for the proof.
Lemma 10 (EDCP self-reduction). Let N,n, and ℓ be integers greater than 1,
r1 and r2 be such that r1 > r2 and r1/r2 = O(κc) for any constant c. Then there
is a probabilistic reduction with run-time polynomial in κ, from G-EDCPℓn,N,r1
(resp. U-EDCPℓn,N,r1) to G-EDCP
O(ℓ/κc+1)
n,N,r2
(resp. U-EDCP
O(ℓ/κc+1)
n,N,r2
).
In the following, we give a reduction from Gaussian-EDCP to DCP. Thus
uniform-EDCP can also be reduced to DCP in two ways: either via self-reduction,
or via Gaussian-EDCP as the next lemma shows. This result is especially inter-
esting when the parameter r (orM for the uniform-EDCP) is super-polynomially
large, as in this case, Lemma 10 cannot be applied. Lemma below works with
1-dimensional EDCP. This is without loss of generality as we can combine our
main result (equivalence of LWE and EDCP) with the result of Brakerski et al.
[6] (equivalence of LWEn,q,α and LWE1,qn,α).
Lemma 11 (Gaussian-EDCP to DCP). Let N and ℓ be arbitrary integers.
Then there is a probabilistic reduction with run-time polynomial in κ, from
G-EDCPℓ1,N,r to DCP
O(ℓ/(log r·κ2))
N if r ≥ 3 logN , and from G-EDCPℓ1,N,r to
DCP
O(ℓ/(r·κ))
N otherwise.
Proof. We are given as input ℓ many G-EDCP1,N,r states:

∑
j∈Z
ρr(j) |j〉 |(xk + j · s) mod N〉


k≤ℓ
.
We show how to find s if we are given access to a DCP
O(ℓ/(r·κ))
N oracle for
r < 3 logN , and a DCP
O(ℓ/(log r·κ2))
N oracle otherwise.
• Case r ≥ 3 logN .
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According to Lemma 8, we can transform ℓ many G-EDCP1,N,r states into
ℓ/κ many U-EDCP1,N,M ′ states with M
′ = 2c · r + 1 for some constant c losing
a factor of κ samples. Assume we obtain ℓ/κ many U-EDCP1,N,M ′ samples. For
each such state, we symmetrize the interval [0,M ′] as in the proof of Lemma 9.
Then we receive a uniform distribution over [−M,M ] for M = (M ′ − 1)/2. We
compute the absolute value of the first register and store it in a new register:∑
j∈[−M,M ]
|j〉 |(xˆk + j · s) mod N〉 ||j|〉 , (4)
where xˆk = xk −M · s. We measure the third register and denote the observed
value by vk.
We make use of the two well-known facts from number theory. For proofs, the
reader may consult [29, Chapter 5]. First, there exist more than M/ logM many
primes that are smaller than M . Second, N has at most 2 logN/ log logN prime
factors. Thus there are at least M/ logM − 2 logN/ log logN many numbers
smaller than M that are co-prime with all prime factors of N .
From the above, with probability Ω(1/ logM) = Ω(1/ log r), the observed
value vk is non-zero and co-prime with N . If this is not the case, we discard the
state. Otherwise, we obtain (up to normalization):
|−vk〉 |(xˆk − vk · s) mod N〉+ |vk〉 |(xˆk + vk · s) mod N〉 .
We multiply the value in the second register by v−1k mod N :
|−vk〉 |(x′k − s) mod N〉+ |vk〉 |(x′k + s) mod N〉 ,
where x′k = xˆk · v−1k .
Let x¯k = x
′
k − s mod N and s¯ = 2 · s mod N . Rewrite the above state as:
|−vk〉 |x¯k〉+ |vk〉 |(x¯k + s¯) mod N〉 .
As we know vk classically, we uncompute the first register and obtain a DCP
state:
|0〉 |x¯k〉+ |1〉 |(x¯k + s¯) mod N〉 . (5)
We repeat the above procedure until we obtain O(ℓ/(log r ·κ2)) many DCPN
states with probability ≥ 1− 2−Ω(κ).
• Case that r < 3 logN .
The first steps are identical to the proof for the case r ≥ 3 logN : Compute
the absolute value of the first register to get a state as in (4) and measure the
third register. Denote the observed value by vk. Now we keep only those states,
for which vk = 1 was observed. Otherwise, we do not use the state. In case
vk = 1, we can easily transform the result to the state given in (5) analogously
to the proof for r ≥ 3 logN .
Now we show that vk = 1 occurs with probability Ω(1/r) independently over
all k’s. Indeed,
Pr[vk = 1] =
ρr(1)
2 + ρr(−1)2∑
j∈Z ρr(j)2
≥ 2 · ρr(1)
2∫
R
ρr(x)2dx+ 1
=
2 · exp(− 2πr2 )
r√
2
+ 1
= Ω
(1
r
)
.
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We repeat the above procedure until we obtain O(ℓ/(r ·κ)) many DCPN states,
which happens with probability ≥ 1− 2−Ω(κ).
In both cases considered in this lemma, we can use the DCP
O(ℓ/(r·κ))
N oracle
and get the secret s¯. There are at most 2 possible values s such that s¯ = 2s mod
N : if there are 2 possibilities, we uniformly choose either, which decreases the
success probability by at most a factor of 2.
3 Reduction from LWE to EDCP
In this section, we reduce LWEmn,q,α to G-EDCP
ℓ
n,q,r, where r ≈ 1/α up to a
factor of poly(n log q). Analogous to Regev’s reductions from uSVP to DCP, we
present two versions of the reduction from LWE to G-EDCP. The second one is
tighter with respect to the parameter losses. At the end of the section we show
that using the same algorithm, one can reduce the decisional version of LWE to
the decisional version of EDCP (see Def. 5).
3.1 First reduction: using cube separation
The main result of this section is the following theorem.
Theorem 2 (LWE ≤ EDCP). Let (n, q, α) be LWE parameters and (n, q, r) be
EDCP parameters. Given m = n log q = Ω(κ) many LWEn,q,α samples, there
exists a probabilistic quantum reduction, with run-time polynomial in κ, from
LWEmn,q,α to G-EDCP
ℓ
n,q,r, where r < 1/(32mκαℓq
n/m).
The main step of our reduction is to partition the ambient space Rm with an
appropriately chosen grid (cubes). This is analogous to Regev’s reduction from
uSVP to DCP [24]. Lemma 12 shows how we choose the width of the cell in our
grid. Figure 2 gives a 2-dimensional example of such a grid.
Lemma 12. For a constant c ≥ 8, a matrix A ∈ Zm×nq is randomly chosen for
integers q, n, m = n log q, and k ≥ m, consider a function
g : (x1, · · · , xm)→ (⌊x1/z − w1 mod q¯⌋, · · · , ⌊xm/z − wm mod q¯⌋),
where z = q/c and z ∈ [1/c, 1/2] · λ∞1 (Λq(A)), w1, . . . , wm are uniformly chosen
from [0, 1), and q¯ = q/z. Then for any x ∈ Znq , we have the following two
statements.
– For any u = Ax+e1,v = Ax+e2 where ‖e1‖∞, ‖e2‖∞ ≤ λ∞1 (Λq(A))/(2ck),
with probability (1 − 1/k)m, over the randomness of w1, · · · , wm, we have
g(u) = g(v).
– For any u = Ax+e1,v = Ax̂+e2, where ‖e1‖∞, ‖e2‖∞ ≤ λ∞1 (Λq(A))/(2ck)
and x 6= x̂ ∈ Znq , we have g(u) 6= g(v).
Proof. • Proof for the first claim.
Write u = Ax + e1 mod q and v = Ax + e2 mod q for some x ∈ Znq and
‖e1‖∞, ‖e2‖∞ ≤ λ∞1 (Λq(A))/(2ck).
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Let diff denote the event that g(u) 6= g(v), and, for all i ≤ m, let diffi
denote the event that the ith coordinates of g(u) and g(v) differ. Since we choose
w1, . . . , wm independently and uniformly from [0, 1), we can consider each of m
dimension separately and view each e1,i/z+wi and e2,i/z+wi as random 1-dim.
real points inside an interval of length 1. We have
Pr
wi
[diffi] =
|e1,i − e2,i|
z
≤ z/k
z
=
1
k
,
where the inequality follows from the lower-bound on z. This implies
Pr
w
[no diff] =
∏
i≤m
(
1− Pr
wi
[diffi]
)
≥
(
1− 1
k
)m
.
• Proof for the second claim.
Write u = Ax + e1 mod q and v = Ax̂ + e2 mod q for x 6= x̂ ∈ Znq and
‖e1‖∞, ‖e2‖∞ ≤ λ∞1 (Λq(A))/(2ck). Then we have
g(u) =
⌊1
z
· (Ax) + 1
z
· e1 +w mod q¯
⌋
,
g(v) =
⌊1
z
· (Ax̂) + 1
z
· e2 +w mod q¯
⌋
.
Now we show that g(u) and g(v) differ in at least 1 coordinate. This is the
case if the arguments of the floor function differ by 1 in at least one coordinate,
i.e., ‖ 1zA · (x− xˆ) + 1z (e1 − e2) mod q¯‖∞ ≥ 1.
Assume the contrary is the case. Note that due to our choice of ei and q¯,
‖ 1z (e1 − e2) mod q¯‖∞ is either at most 1/k or at least q¯ − 1/k. Either way we
have ‖ 1zA(x − xˆ) mod q¯‖∞ < 1 + 1/k or ‖ 1zA(x − xˆ) mod q¯‖∞ > q¯ − 1 + 1/k.
Due to the bounds on z and c, the former case is equivalent to
‖A(x− xˆ) mod q¯‖∞ < z + z/k ≤ λ∞1 (Λq¯(A))
(
1
2 +
1
2k
)
≤ λ∞1 (Λq¯(A)).
Hence, we have just found a vector in the lattice Λq¯(A) shorter than the mini-
mum of the lattice. In the latter case when ‖ 1zA · (x− xˆ) mod q¯‖∞ > q¯−1/k+1,
we obtain the same contradiction by noticing that Λq¯ contains q¯-ary vectors.
Proof (of Theorem 2). Assume we are given an LWEmn,q,α instance (A,b0) with
b0 = A · s0 + e0 mod q. Our aim is to find s0 given access to a G-EDCPℓn,q,r
oracle.
We first prepare a necessary number of registers in the state |0〉 and transform
them to the state of the form (normalization omitted)
∑
s∈Znq
|0〉 |s〉 |0〉 . (6)
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|0〉
✤
✤
✤
✤
✤
✤
✤
✤
✤
✤
Grover
Rudolf
✤
✤
✤
✤
✤
✤
✤
✤
✤
✤
Uf
✤
✤
✤
✤
✤
✤
✤
✤
✤
✤
✤
✤
✤
✤
✤
✤
✤
✤
✤
✤
Uf
✤
✤
✤
✤
✤
✤
✤
✤
✤
✤
UEDCP
|0〉 QFTZnq
|0〉
Ug
|0〉
|0〉 ✌✌
g(a · s− je0)
(6) (7) (3.1) (8) (3.1)
Fig. 5: Quantum circuit for our reduction LWE ≤ EDCP. All the global phases
are omitted. The input registers are assumed to have the required number of
qubits. Function f is defined as Uf |j〉 |s〉 |0〉 → |j〉 |s〉 |As− jb mod q〉. Function
Ug is the embedding of function g described in Lemma 12, i.e. Ug |x〉 |0〉 →
|x〉 |⌊x/z −w mod q¯⌋〉 for appropriately chosen z,w, q¯.
We use Lemma 4 to obtain a state within ℓ2 distance of 2
−Ω(κ) away from∑
s∈Znq
(∑
j∈Z
ρr(j) |j〉
)
|s〉 |0〉 . (7)
According to Lemma 1, the state above is within ℓ2 distance of 2
−Ω(κ) away
from3 ∑
s∈Znq
j∈Z∩[−√κ·r,√κ·r]
ρr(j) |j〉 |s〉 |0〉 .
We evaluate the function f(j, s) 7→ As − j · b mod q and store the result in
the third register. The next equality follows from a change of variable on s∑
s∈Znq
j∈Z∩[−√κ·r,√κ·r]
ρr(j) |j〉 |s〉 |As− j ·As0 − je0〉 =
∑
s∈Znq
j∈Z∩[−√κ·r,√κ·r]
ρr(j) |j〉 |s+ js0〉 |As − je0〉 .
Sample w1, . . . , wm uniformly from [0, 1). Set z = q/c for some constant
c ≥ 8, thus we have z ∈ [1/c, 1/2] · λ∞1 (Λq(A)), where the upper bound holds
with probability 1− 2−m = 1− 2−Ω(κ) (see Lemmata 5).
For x ∈ Zmq , we define
g(x) = (⌊(x1/z − w1) mod q¯⌋, . . . , ⌊(xm/z − wm) mod q¯⌋),
3 Here we cut the tail of the Gaussian distribution on the first register. Otherwise, a
measurement that follows leads to a state mixed with noisy vectors from different
lattice points with large (unbounded) noise. However, it has ℓ2 distance exponentially
close to the state we consider in the current algorithm.
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where q¯ = q/z = c. We evaluate the function g on the third register and store
the result on a new register. We obtain∑
s∈Znq
j∈Z∩[−√κ·r,√κ·r]
ρr(j) |j〉 |s + j · s0〉 |As− j · e0〉 |g(As− j · e0)〉 . (8)
We measure the fourth register and do not consider it further. According to
Lemma 1, we have ‖e0‖∞ ≤
√
καq with probability ≥ 1− 2−Ω(m) = 1− 2−Ω(κ).
Recall that r < 1/(32mℓκαqn/m) ≤ 1/(4ckκαqn/m) for c = 8 and k = mℓ.
Therefore, we have ‖√κr · e0‖∞ ≤ λ∞1 (Λq(A))/(2ck). Then by Lemma 12, we
obtain ∑
j∈Z∩[−√κ·r,√κ·r]
ρr(j) |j〉 |s+ j · s0〉 |As− j · e0〉
for some s ∈ Znq , with probability (1 − 1/k)m over the randomness of A and
w1, · · · , wm.
Finally, we evaluate the function (j, s,b) 7→ b−As+ j ·b0 on the first three
registers, which gives 0. Discarding this 0-register, the state is of the form∑
j∈Z∩[−√κ·r,√κ·r]
ρr(j) |j〉 |s+ j · s0〉 .
According to Lemma 1, the above state is within ℓ2 distance of 2
−Ω(κ) away
from ∑
j∈Z
ρr(j) |j〉 |s+ j · s0〉 .
We repeat the above procedure ℓ times, and with probability (1 − 1k )mℓ, we
obtain ℓ many G-EDCPℓn,q,r states

∑
j∈Z
ρr(j) |j〉 |xk + j · s0〉


k≤ℓ
,
where xk ∈ Znq .
Now we can call the G-EDCPℓn,q,r oracle with the above states as input and
obtain s0 as output of the oracle.
3.2 An improved reduction: using balls’ intersection
Here we give an improved reduction from LWE to EDCP. Following the idea of
Regev ([24][Section 3.3]), instead of separating the ambient space Zm by cubes,
we consider intersections of balls drawn around the points As and its shifts.
Note that with this reduction we improve the upper-bound on r essentially by
the factor of
√
m.
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Theorem 3 (LWE ≤ EDCP). Let (n, q, α) be LWE parameters and (n, q, r)
be EDCP parameters. Given m = Ω(κ) many LWEn,q,α samples, there ex-
ists a quantum reduction, with run-time polynomial in κ, from LWEmn,q,α to
G-EDCPℓn,q,r, where r < 1/(6
√
2πe
√
mκℓαqn/m).
We give an intuitive idea of how the reduction works. All the necessary
lemmata and the full proof are given in Appendix B.
Informally, the reduction works as follows. Given an LWE instance (A,b =
As0+e0) ∈ Zm×nq ×Zmq , for each s ∈ Znq , we consider (in a superposition over all
such s) a lattice point As together with its small shifts of As−je0, where j’s are
drawn from a small interval symmetric around 0. So far this is exactly what we
did in the first (weaker) reduction. Note that we receive a configuration of points
in Zmq as depicted in Figure 3. Note that contrary to Regev’s reduction, where
there is only one shift (i.e., the DCP case), our extrapolated version considers
poly(κ) shifts thus leading us to the EDCP case.
Let us fix some As together with its shifts. Draw a ball around each shift of
a maximal radius R such that there is no intersection between the shifts coming
from different lattice points, i.e. there is no j, j′ s.t. B(As − je0, R) ∩ B(As′ −
j′e0, R) 6= ∅ for any two s, s′ such that s 6= s′. To satisfy this condition, we
can take R almost as large as the first minimum of the lattice Λq(A) (again,
see Figure 3). With such an R, due to the fact that the shifts are small, the
intersection of the balls drawn around the shifts is large enough (see Lemma 13
in Appendix B). Hence, once we measure the register that ‘stores’ our balls, the
resulting state collapses (with large enough probability) to a superposition of
some As for one s and all its shifts. Informally, the higher this probability is,
the tighter the parameters achieved by the reduction.
3.3 Reduction from dLWE to dEDCP
As a corollary to the above theorem, we show that the decisional LWE can be
reduced to decisional EDCP. In fact, to establish the reduction, we use the same
algorithm as for Theorem 3 (a weaker reduction given in Theorem 2 will work
as well). Recall that in the proof, starting from an EDCP sample, we obtain an
LWE sample with non-negligible probability. Corollary 1 below shows that in
case we are given a tuple (A,b) drawn uniformly at random from Zm×nq × Zmq ,
the procedure described in Theorem 3 outputs a state of the form |j〉 |x mod N〉,
a uniform counterpart to EDCP in the sense of Definition 5. The proof of the
following corollary is given in Appendix B.
Corollary 1 (dLWE ≤ dEDCP). Let (n, q, α) be valid dLWE parameters and
(n, q, r) be valid dEDCP parameters. Given m = Ω(κ) many LWEn,q,α samples,
there exists a quantum reduction, with run-time polynomial in κ, from LWEmn,q,α
to G-EDCPℓn,q,r, where r < 1/(6
√
2πe
√
mκℓαq(n+1)/m).
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4 Reduction from EDCP to LWE
In this section, we reduce G-EDCPℓn,N,r to LWE
ℓ
n,N,α, where r ≈ 1/α up to a
factor of poly(n logN). Combined with the result of the previous section, this
gives us equivalence between the two problems: LWE and EDCP, for both search
and decisional variants.
✤
✤
✤
✤
✤
✤
✤
✤
✤
✤
✤
✤
✤
✤
✤
✤
✤
QFTZN
∑
e∈Zq
ρ 1
r
(
e
q
)
|〈a′k, s0〉+ e〉
QFTZn
N
✌✌ ak
∑
j∈Z
ρr(j) |j〉 |xk + j · s0〉
(9) (11)
Fig. 6: Reduction from G-EDCP to LWE
Theorem 4 (EDCP ≤ LWE). Let (n,N, r) be valid EDCP parameters and
(n,N, α) with r = Ω(
√
κ) be valid LWE parameters. Given ℓ = Ω(κ) many
G-EDCPn,N,r samples, there exists a quantum reduction, with run-time polyno-
mial in κ, from G-EDCPℓn,N,r to LWE
ℓ
n,N,α, where α = 1/r.
Proof. Assume we are given ℓ many EDCPn,N,r instances

∑
j∈Z
ρr(j) |j〉 |xk + j · s0 mod N〉


k∈[ℓ]
.
Our aim is to find s0 given access to an LWE
ℓ
n,N,α oracle.
For each input state, the quantum Fourier transform over ZnN is applied to
the second register, which yields (without loss of generality, consider the kth
sample) ∑
a∈ZnN
∑
j∈Z
ω
〈a,(xk+j·s0)〉
N · ρr(j) |j〉 |a〉 . (9)
Then we measure the second register and let ak denote the observed value.
Note that each element of ZnN is measured with probability 1/N
n and that the
distributions for different k’s are independent. Omitting the global phase of each
state, we obtain ∑
j∈Z
ω
〈ak,(j·s0)〉
N · ρr(j) |j〉 |ak〉 . (10)
We omit the second register as we know each ak classically. Since N ≫ r, from
Lemma 1 it follows that the resulting state is within ℓ2 distance of 2
−Ω(κ) away
from the state (note the change in the range for j)∑
j∈ZN
ω
j·〈ak,s0〉
N · ρr(j) |j〉 . (11)
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For each such an input state, the quantum Fourier transform over ZN yields∑
b∈ZN
∑
j∈ZN
ω
j·(〈ak,s0〉+b)
N · ρr(j) |b〉 . (12)
Once again we use Lemma 1 to argue that the state above is within ℓ2 distance
of 2−Ω(κ) away from the state∑
b∈ZN
∑
j∈Z
ω
j·(〈ak,s0〉+b)
N · ρr(j) |b〉 .
Using the Poisson summation formula (Lemma 3) and changing the summation
variable to e← N · j + 〈ak, s0〉+ b, the above state can be rewritten as∑
b∈ZN
∑
j∈Z
ρ1/r
(
j +
〈ak, s0〉+ b
N
)
|b〉 =
∑
e∈Z
ρ1/r
( e
N
)
|〈a′k, s0〉+ e mod N〉
where a′k = −ak mod N . Since r = Ω(
√
κ), we can apply Lemma 1 to the above
state (for a scaled Z-lattice), and instead of the above state, consider the state
that is within a 2−Ω(κ) ℓ2-distance from it, namely:∑
e∈ZN
ρ1/r
( e
N
)
|〈a′k, s0〉+ e〉 . (13)
Once we measure the state above, we obtain an LWE sample
(a′k, 〈a′k, s0〉+ ek) ,
where ek ←֓ DZ,N/r.
Now we can call the LWEn,N,α oracle for α = 1/r with the above states as
input and obtain s0 as output of the oracle.
4.1 Reduction from dEDCP to dLWE
Similar to the previous section where as a corollary we show that dLWE can be
reduced to dEDCP, we finish this section by a reverse reduction. Again we use
exactly the same reduction algorithm as for the search versions (see Figure 6).
Thus it remains to show that we can obtain a uniform random sample (a, b) ∈
ZnN × ZN given as input a state of the form |j〉 |x mod N〉.
Corollary 2 (dEDCP ≤ dLWE). Let (n,N, r) be valid dG-EDCP parameters
and (n,N, α) be valid dLWE parameters. Given ℓ = Ω(κ) many EDCPn,N,r
samples, there exists a quantum reduction, with run-time polynomial in κ, from
dG-EDCPℓn,N,r to dLWE
ℓ
n,N,α, where α = 1/r.
Proof. Assume we are given ℓ many samples of EDCPn,N,r either of the form

∑
j∈Z
ρr(j) |j〉 |xk + j · s0〉 mod N


k∈[ℓ]
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or of the form
{|jk〉 |xk mod N〉}k∈[ℓ] ,
where jk ←֓ D2Z,r and xk ∈ ZnN is uniform. Our aim is to distinguish between
the above two forms given access to a dLWEn,N,α oracle.
As explained above, we assume that random samples of EDCP are given. For
each input state, after the quantum Fourier transform over ZnN on the second
register, we obtain ∑
a∈ZnN
ω
〈xk,a〉
N |jk〉 |a〉 .
Then we measure the second register and let ak denote the observed value.
Note that each element of ZnN is measured with probability 1/N
n and that the
distributions for different k’s are independent. Up to a global phase, we have
|jk〉 |ak〉 .
We omit the second register which is known to us. According to Lemma 1,
with probability 1− 2−Ω(κ), the value stored in the first register is in the range
[−⌊N/2⌋, ⌈N/2⌉− 1]. Applying QFT over ZN to the first register, we obtain∑
b∈ZN
ωjk·bN |b〉 .
Once we measure the state above and let bk denote the observed value. Note
that each element of ZN is measured with probability 1/N and that the distri-
butions for different k’s are independent. We obtain a sample
(ak, bk) ,
where (ak, bk) are uniformly random from Z
n
N × ZN .
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A Omitted Proofs from Section 2
A.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. On one hand, from the Poisson summation formula (Lemma 3) for the
lattice Z, we have for r ≥ 1
ρ2r(Z) = det(Z) · 2r ·
∑
y∈Z
ρ1/(2r)(y) ≤ 2r ·
∑
y∈Z
ρ1/r(y) = 2ρr(Z),
where for the inequality, we used the fact that ρ1/(2r) ≤ ρ1/(r).
On the other hand,
ρ2r(Z) > ρ2r(Z \ [−B,B]) =
∑
|y|>B
e
− πy2
(2r)2
=
∑
|y|>B
e
3
4
πy2
(2r)2 e−
πy2
r2 ≥ e 34
π(B+1)2
(2r)2 ρr(Z \ [−B,B]).
Combining the two inequalities for ρ2r and setting B =
√
κr, we obtain
ρr(Z\[−
√
κr,
√
κr]) < e
− 34 π(
√
κr+1)2
(2r)2 ρ2r(Z) ≤ 2e−
3
4
π(
√
κr+1)2
(2r)2 ρr(Z) = 2
−Ω(κ)ρr(Z).
A.2 Proof of Lemma 10: EDCP self-reduction
Proof. We are given as input ℓ many G-EDCPN,ℓ,r1 states:

∑
j∈Z
ρr1(j) |j〉 |(xk + j · s) mod N〉


k≤ℓ
.
Our aim is to find s, given access to a G-EDCPN,ℓ,r2 oracle.
For each G-EDCPN,ℓ,r1 sample, we proceed as follows. Using Lemma 7, we
can transform a G-EDCPN,ℓ,r1 state into a G-EDCPN,ℓ,r2 state with probability
Ω(1/κc): 

∑
j∈Z
ρr2(j) |j〉 |(xk + j · s) mod N〉


k≤ℓ
.
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We repeat the above procedure for all given samples. With probability at
least 1− 2−Ω(κ), we obtain O(ℓ/κc+1) many G-EDCPN,ℓ,r2 states. Then we can
use the G-EDCPN,O(ℓ/κc+1),r2 oracle to recover the secret s as the solution for
the G-EDCPN,ℓ,r1 instance.
The same arguments apply to the uniform EDCP: from U-EDCPN,ℓ,r1 to
U-EDCPN,O(ℓ/κc+1),r2 In this case, via quantum rejection sampling, we trans-
form a wide uniform distribution into a narrow uniform distribution.
B Omitted Proofs from Section 3
B.1 Proof of Theorem 3
We need two lemmata to establish a proof of Theorem 3. The first lemma due
to Regev (see [24, Corollary 3.9]) shows how large the intersection of two shifted
balls is. Note that a quantum state we work with is a discretized ball 1LZ
n ∩
Bn(0, R). The difference between Regev’s lemma and the one we present below
is that we consider intersections of the balls taken mod q.
Lemma 13 (Adapted from [24, Corollary 3.9]). Let L = 2n and consider
the scaled integer grid 1LZ
n. For any R ≥ 1, let B¯n(0, R) = Bn(0, R) + d¯ for
some vector d¯ such that R/poly(n) ≤ ‖d¯‖ ≤ R. Then, for an integer q > 2R+ d¯
we have
| 1LZn ∩ Bn(0, R) ∩ B¯n(0, R) mod q|
| 1LZn ∩ Bn(0, R) mod q|
≥ 1−O(√n‖d¯/R‖).
The following technical lemma is again due to Regev [24]. It shows that while
we cannot create a quantum state that perfectly corresponds to a uniform super-
position of x ∈ 1LZn ∩ Bn(0, R) (i.e., a ball), we can have a good approximation
to this state. This fact will only increase the running time of the reduction by a
factor of poly(κ).
Lemma 14 ([24, Lemma 3.11]). For any 1 ≤ R ≤ 2poly(n), let
|η〉 = 1√
| 1LZn ∩ Bn(0, R)|
∑
x∈ 1LZn∩Bn(0,R)
|x〉
be the uniform superposition on grid points inside a ball of radius R around the
origin where L = 2n. Then, for any c > 0, a state |η˜〉 whose trace distance from
|η〉 is at most 1/nc can be efficiently computed.
Now we are ready to give the proof of Theorem 3.
Proof (of Theorem 3). Assume we are given an LWEn,q,α instance (A,b0) ∈
Zm×nq × Zmq , with b0 = As0 + e0 mod q. Our aim is to find s0 given access to a
G-EDCPℓn,q,r oracle.
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We first prepare a necessary number of registers in the state |0〉 and transform
it to the state of the form (normalization omitted)∑
s∈Znq
|0〉 |s〉 |0〉 .
We use Lemma 4 to obtain a state within ℓ2 distance of 2
−Ω(κ) away from
∑
s∈Znq
(∑
j∈Z
ρr(j) |j〉
)
|s〉 |0〉 .
According to Lemma 1, the state above is within ℓ2 distance of 2
−Ω(κ) away
from ∑
s∈Znq
j∈Z∩[−√κ·r,√κ·r]
ρr(j) |j〉 |s〉 |0〉 .
We evaluate the function f(j, s) 7→ As − j · b mod q and store the result in
the third register. A change of variable on s yields∑
s∈Znq
j∈Z∩[−√κ·r,√κ·r]
ρr(j) |j〉 |s〉 |As− jAs0 − je0〉 =
∑
s∈Znq
j∈Z∩[−√κ·r,√κ·r]
ρr(j) |j〉 |s+ js0〉 |As− je0〉 .
We take an auxiliary register |0〉. We set L = 2m as a discretization pa-
rameter and R = Θ(
√
mq(m−n)/m). As the LWE problem is well defined with
m = Θ(n) many samples, it suffices to satisfy
√
mq(m−n)/m/(3
√
2πe) ≤ q. Thus
according to Lemma 6, we also have R ≤ λ1(Λq(A))/3, where the inequal-
ity holds with probability 2−m = 2−Ω(κ) for some appropriate choice of con-
stants. Using Lemma 14, we prepare a state which is at most 1/nc away from
|η〉 =∑x∈ 1LZm∩Bm(0,R) |x〉 for any constant c > 0. We set c such that it satisfies
(1 − 1/nc) > (1 − 1/κ) to have the success probability claimed at the end of
the reduction. We pretend we work with the state |η〉, which we tensor with our
current state, and obtain∑
s∈Znq
j∈Z∩[−√κ·r,√κ·r]
∑
x∈ 1LZm∩Bm(0,R)
ρr(j) |j〉 |s+ j · s0〉 |A · s− j · e0〉 |x〉 .
We apply the function g(x,y) = (x,x + y mod q) on the third and fourth
registers (note that the mod q operation is done over rational numbers). The
state becomes a superposition over the balls of radius R centered at all lattice
points As and their shifts defined by j. Formally, we obtain∑
s∈Znq
j∈Z∩[−√κ·r,√κ·r]
∑
x∈ 1LZm∩Bn(0,R)
ρr(j) |j〉 |s+ j · s0〉 |As− j · e0〉 |As− j · e0 + x mod q〉 .
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We measure the fourth register and discard it, as now we know it classically.
Using Lemma 2 on lattice Zm and shift 0, we have ‖e0‖ ≤
√
mαq with probability
≥ 1− 2−Ω(m) = 1− 2−Ω(κ). Recall that r ≤ 1/(√mκℓαqn/m) (up to constants).
Therefore, we have ‖√κr · e0‖ ≤ q(m−n)/m/ℓ.
We use Lemma 13 with d¯ = q(m−n)/m/ℓ and radius R = Θ(
√
mq(m−n)/m).
Note that due to the minimal distance of Λq(A), the balls emerging from two
different lattice points (or their shifts) do no intersect. Hence, the measurement
yields ∑
j∈Z∩[−√κ·r,√κ·r]
ρr(j) |j〉 |s+ j · s0〉 |As− j · e0〉
for some s ∈ Znq , with probability O(1−1/ℓ) taken over the uniform distribution
defined on Bm(0, R).
Finally, we evaluate the function (j, s,b) 7→ b−As+ j ·b0 on the first three
registers. Discarding the last register, the state is of the form∑
j∈Z∩[−√κ·r,√κ·r]
ρr(j) |j〉 |s+ j · s0〉 .
According to Lemma 1, the latter is within ℓ2 distance of 2
−Ω(κ) away from∑
j∈Z
ρr(j) |j〉 |s+ j · s0〉 .
We repeat the above procedure ℓ times, and with non-negligible probability
(1− 1/ℓ)ℓ, we obtain ℓ many G-EDCPn,q,r states

∑
j∈Z
ρr(j) |j〉 |xk + j · s0〉


k≤ℓ
,
where xk ∈ Znq .
Now we can call the G-EDCPmn,q,r oracle with the above states as input and
obtain s0 as the output of the oracle.
Proof (of Corollary 1). We are given m many samples from Zm×nq × Zmq either
of the form
(A,As0 + e0),
or of the form
(A,b),
where A ∈ Zm×nq is uniformly chosen, s0 ∈ Znq is fixed, e0 ∈ DZm,αq and b ∈ Zmq
is uniformly chosen and independent from a. Our aim is to distinguish between
the above two cases given access to a dG-EDCPℓn,q,r oracle.
We follow the procedure of the reduction algorithm used in the proof of The-
orem 3 except that now we set R = Θ(
√
mq(m−n−1)/m). As the LWE problem
is well defined with m = Θ(n) many samples, we can guarantee (for an appro-
priate choice of constants) that
√
mq(m−n)/m/(3
√
2πe) ≤ q. Thus, we also have
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R ≤ λ1(Λq(A|b))/3, where the inequality holds with probability 2−m = 2−Ω(κ)
(see Lemma 6).
We run the algorithm described in the proof of Theorem 3 until we obtain a
state of the form∑
s∈Znq
j∈Z∩[−√κ·r,√κ·r]
∑
x∈ 1LZm∩Bm(0,R)
ρr(j) |j〉 |s〉 |As− j · b〉 |As− j · b+ x〉 .
We measure the fourth register and ignore it from now on. Due to the bound
on r, we have q ≥ 2√κr. Thus all the balls created with centers over the lattice
points As and their shifts As− jb, do not intersect with each other. Therefore,
with probability 1−O(1/ℓ) we obtain
|jk〉 |sk〉 |Ask − jk · b〉
for some jk ∈ Z is distributed as D2Z,r and some uniform sk ∈ Znq .
Finally, we evaluate the function (j, s,b) 7→ b−As+ j ·b0 on the first three
registers. This zeroizes the last register, which we can safely discard. Now the
state is of the form
|jk〉 |sk〉 ,
where jk ←֓ D2Z,r and sk ∈ Znq is uniformly chosen.
We repeat the above procedure ℓ times, and with probability (1 −O(1/ℓ))ℓ,
we obtain ℓ many random samples of the form
{|jk〉 |sk〉}k≤ℓ ,
where sk is chosen uniformly at random from Z
n
q . This is exactly an input to
dEDCP with respect to of Definition 5.
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